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Abstract
Partner selection is an important process in many social interactions, permitting individ-
uals to decrease the risks associated with cooperation. In large populations, defectors may
escape punishment by roving from partner to partner, but defectors in smaller populations
risk social isolation. We investigate these possibilities for an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma
in which agents use expected payos to choose and refuse partners. In comparison to random
or round-robin partner matching, we nd that the average payos attained with preferential
partner selection tend to be more narrowly conned to a few isolated payo regions. Most
ecologies evolve to essentially full cooperative behavior, but when agents are intolerant of
defections, or when the costs of refusal and social isolation are small, we also see the emer-
gence of wallower ecologies in which all agents are socially isolated. In between these two
extremes, we see the emergence of ecologies whose agents tend to engage in a small number
of defections followed by cooperation thereafter. The latter ecologies exhibit a plethora of
interesting social interaction patterns.
Keywords: Evolutionary Game; Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma; Partner Choice and Refusal;
Articial Life; Genetic Algorithm; Finite Automata.
1 Introduction
Following the path-breaking work of Axelrod (1984; 1987; 1988), the Iterated Prisoner's
Dilemma (IPD) is now commonly used by researchers to explore the potential emergence of
mutually cooperative behavior among non-altruistic agents. See, for example, Miller (1989)
and Lindgren and Nordahl (1994). These studies have shown that mutually cooperative
behavior tends to emerge if the number of game iterations is either uncertain or innite, the
frequency of mutually cooperative play in initial game iterations is suciently high, and the
perceived probability of future interactions with any given current opponent is suciently
large.
Most studies of IPD assume that individual players have no control over which oppo-
nents they play. Players are matched as game partners either randomly or by means of a
deterministic mechanism such as round-robin or grid neighborhood play. In real-life situa-
tions, however, agents are not always prisoners who have no alternative but to play their
assigned PD games. Instead, social interactions are often characterized by the preferential
choice and refusal of partners. In what ways, then, might the introduction of preferential
partner selection change the nature of the IPD?
Previous research suggests that, depending upon the precise population structure, the
decision rules used for partner selection, and the penalties imposed for rejected oers and for
deciding not to play, cooperators or defectors may benet from preferential partner selection.
For example, Kitcher (1992) and Schuessler (1989) show that the option of refusing to play
previously defecting players can increase the tness of cooperative players and allow them
to invade defecting populations. Orbell and Dawes (1993) argue that it is to the benet of
society as a whole to evolve social structures that allow individuals to opt out of games.
Their experiments indicate that humans who are themselves cooperatively inclined tend to
be more optimistic about the cooperative intentions of other players and hence to play more
games. In Eshel and Cavalli-Sforza (1982), benecial assortative mixing may occur either
because agents playing the same strategy are more likely to encounter each other, or because
agents playing cooperative strategies actively select each other.
The ability to actively seek out known cooperators as partners also provides an incentive
for agents to be reliably cooperative, so that they will be chosen as partners, and this
potentially increases the incidence of cooperation in a society (Tullock, 1985). Hirshleifer
and Rasmussen (1989) nd that group ostracism can permit cooperative agents to protect
themselves from defectors. On the other hand, Dugatkin (1991) shows that the ability
to choose partners in large populations divided into isolated patches may permit roving
defectors to move from one patch to the next, avoiding ostracism while taking advantage of
each patch in turn.
Finally, the introduction of preferential partner selection results in social networks of
interacting players. Who chooses whom, and why, aects who does well, and this in turn
aects the outcomes of the overall game. Questions about social network formation are key
to understanding societies. How do groups form? What roles do highly connected individuals
play? Social networks are also interesting because they are pathways for the transmission of
diseases, information, and cultural traits.
In a previous paper (Stanley et al., 1994), we studied an IPD choice and refusal mecha-
nism that combines active choice of potential game partners with the ability to refuse play
with those judged to be intolerable. Players use continually updated expected payos to
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assess the relative desirability of potential partners. This use of expected payos is meant
to capture the idea that players attempt to select partners rationally, using some degree of
anticipation, even though they do not know their partners' strategies and payos. Our choice
and refusal mechanism is thus more exible and general than many of the mechanisms stud-
ied by previous researchers, although it does not currently allow for the information exchange
between players assumed by Kitcher. Also, we considered a single small population, so that
defectors cannot rove from one isolated population to the next, as in Dugatkin (1991), but
instead risk eventual ostracism.
In particular, we studied how the ability both to choose and to refuse potential game
partners aects interactions among a small set of simple IPD strategies, and we used a ve-
player population to illustrate the formation of social networks. We also conducted a number
of evolutionary simulations. The interaction dynamics in both our analytical and simulation
studies were seen to be complex, even for small populations. Choice is used by all players
to home in quickly on those who will cooperate with them. This permits nice players to
interact with each other, but also allows predatory individuals to locate and form long term
relationships with victims within the limit of occasional defection tolerated by the refusal
mechanism. On the other hand, refusal ensures that very nasty players do poorly, since
repeatedly defecting players are typically ostracized as other players increasingly refuse their
oers. Indeed, wallower populations sometimes emerged in which all players defected until
they became solitary, neither making nor accepting game oers from other players. Overall,
however, we observed cooperation to emerge much more quickly and frequently with choice
and refusal of partners than with round-robin matching.
In this paper we present a variety of new analytical and simulation ndings on the
evolutionary IPD with choice and refusal of partners, or evolutionary IPD/CR for short.
We rst review in Section 2 the basic structure and implementation of the evolutionary
IPD/CR. In particular, we discuss the nite state machines used to represent players' IPD
strategies as well as the genetic algorithm used to evolve the player population from an
initial, randomly-chosen population.
Just as humans cannot instantly evolve wings, so players in our co-evolutionary frame-
work cannot necessarily jump from a defecting mode of behavior to a cooperative one. In
particular, the genetic material available in our initial population constrains its future evolu-
tion. This path dependence turns out to be particularly important for the interpretation of
the IPD/CR simulation studies reported in the present paper, since we work with relatively
small populations of thirty players. Section 3 thus undertakes an analytical characterization
of the distribution of behaviors in the initial player population. In particular, it is shown that
a uniformly distributed selection of genetic structures for these players implies a nonuniform
selection of their IPD strategies, one that is highly biased towards simple strategies.
In the nal two sections we detail a series of simulation studies that have been conducted
to explore the sensitivity of evolutionary IPD/CR outcomes to changes in key parameters.
In particular, we rst describe one-parameter and two-parameter sensitivity studies for the
parameters characterizing the choice and refusal mechanism. We then report on experiments
conducted to test the sensitivity of outcomes to changes in the potential complexity of
players' IPD strategies, as measured by the number of states in their nite state machine
representations. Also, we briey summarize preliminary studies in which two key parameters
characterizing the choice and refusal mechanism are incorporated into the genetic structure
of each player and allowed to evolve over time. Finally, we discuss the sensitivity of the
2
Player 1
Player 2 c d
c 3 5
d 0 1
Table 1: The PD payo matrix for player 1 used in all simulations. Player 1's moves are
given across the top and player 2's down the side.
behavioral diversity of our populations to changes in the implementation of the genetic
algorithm used to evolve our player populations.
2 The Evolutionary IPD/CR Simulations
Each simulation discussed in this paper is initialized with a randomly generated population
of N players, whose genetic code species their strategies for playing iterated prisoner's
dilemma. The simulation then consists of a sequence of generations inter-spaced with genetic
steps. Each generation engages in an IPD/CR tournament consisting of I iterations in
which the agents choose and refuse partners for games of prisoner's dilemma. In the genetic
step, the scores from this tournament are used to assess each player's relative tness and a
new population of N players is then generated via a genetic algorithm with crossover and
mutation.
2.1 Prisoner's Dilemma
The one-shot prisoner's dilemma game is a game between two players. Each player has two
possible moves, cooperate c or defect d, and each player must move without knowing the
move of the other player. If both players defect, each receives a payo D. If both cooperate,
each receives a payo C which is strictly greater than D. Finally, if one defects and the other
cooperates, the cooperating player receives the lowest possible payo L and the defecting
player receives the highest possible payo H, where L < D < C < H. The payos are also
restricted to satisfy (L+H)=2 < C, so that unsynchronized alternations of cooperation and
defection with the same partner do not yield as high an average payo as repeated mutual
cooperation. Table 1 shows the particular values of these payos used in our simulations,
which satisfy these restrictions.
The dilemma in the one-shot PD game is that, if both players defect, both do worse than
if both had cooperated, yet there is always an incentive for an individual player to defect.
The best response to defection is to defect, because this avoids the lowest payo, L; and the
best response to cooperation is to defect, because this achieves the highest payo, H.
2.2 Choice and Refusal of Partners
There are many dierent procedures which individuals might use to select partners. In
deciding how to model partner selection, we considered situations, such as the dating game,
where people interact locally and want to pair up either with their best choice or with
someone who directly approaches them and oers to interact.
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Specically, we assume that there is a potential cost to making a PD game oer|such
as the shame of being refused|whereas receiving oers is costless. In addition, we impose
a (possibly small) cost on wallower players who neither make nor accept oers, which is
intended to deter this kind of behavior. We also assume that each individual considers the
merits of each oer separately from every other oer, implying that a player with many oers
may play many games.
As a simple way of ranking their potential partners, our players use expected payos to
keep a running tab on how well they are doing against each other player. While real humans
presumably use more complex rules to select partners, this method of ranking individuals
allows us to begin to study the eects of partner selection from a broader perspective than
previous researchers.
2.3 The IPD/CR Tournament
We study a slightly simplied version of the choice and refusal tournament of Stanley et al.
(1994). Each generation engages in a tournament consisting of I iterations. At the beginning
of each iteration i  1, each player n associates an expected payo with each other player m,
denoted by 
i 1
(mjn). This expected payo is used to determine which players are tolerable
as partners and which player it will choose.
Given any player n, another player m is tolerable for player n in iteration i if and only if

i 1
(mjn)   ; (1)
where  is the minimum tolerance level . If any players are tolerable to player n, then it
makes an oer to the player m for whom its expected payo 
i 1
(mjn) is highest, with any
ties being settled by a random draw.
After these choices are completed, each player is given an opportunity to refuse oers.
Each player refuses all PD game oers received from intolerable players and accepts all
others. Players cannot opt out of an oer received from someone they judged to be tolerable
at the beginning of the iteration. Each time an oer is refused, the player making the oer
receives a refusal payo , R. A player who nds all players intolerable, and hence who neither
makes nor accepts any oers, receives a wallower payo , W . All accepted PD game oers
are then played. Even when two players choose each other, they only play one PD game
with each other.
In the initial iteration 1, prior to any interactions, all players have the same initial
expected payo 
0
for each player. After this, expected payos are modied whenever two
players interact. Consider any two players n and m. If n neither made nor accepted a PD
game oer from m in the current iteration i, then n's expected payo 
i 1
(mjn) for the play
of a PD game with m in iteration i is not changed. On the other hand, suppose player n
either received a PD payo or a refusal payo from interacting with playerm. Let this payo
be denoted by U . Then player n's expected payo from player m is modied by taking a
weighted average over player n's payo history with player m,

i
(mjn) = !
i 1
(mjn) + (1   !)U ; (2)
where the memory weight ! controls the relative weighting of distant to recent payos.
1
1
This mechanism for updating expected payos is a special case of criterion ltering, i.e., the direct
updating of expected return functions on the basis of past return observations. See Tesfatsion (1979).
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In an IPD/CR game, the players have some degree of control over the number of PD
games they play|equivalently, over the number of moves they make|and players not par-
ticipating in PD games can still receive wallower and refusal payos. Dierent players can
therefore end up playing dierent numbers of games, and not all payos are associated with
game plays. Consequently, at the end of the tournament, we measure the tness of each
player by its average payo score calculated as the total sum of its payos divided by the
total number of its payos.
2.4 Finite State Machine Representations of Strategies
Following previous studies of the evolution of strategies for iterated prisoner's dilemma (Axel-
rod, 1987; Miller, 1989; Lindgren, 1991), each player in our simulations is uniquely associated
with a xed deterministic strategy for playing IPD against an arbitrary opponent an inde-
nite number of times, where the only information each player has about its current PD game
partner is its play history with that partner.
We have implemented our model in two dierent programming languages (Turbo Pascal
and C) using two dierent deterministic nite state machine structures: Moore machines as
used in Miller (1989); and Mealy machines with a predetermined initial state, which we will
refer to as IPD machines
2
and which are illustrated in Figure 1. Each of these structures
allows a player to use a variable amount of its play history with each partner to determine
its moves in plays with that partner.
The representation of IPD strategies aects various aspects of our evolutionary study,
including the distribution of behaviors in the initial randomly-chosen population of players
and the manner in which recombination and mutation create new players. Our use of two
dierent representations has resulted in generally similar experimental outcomes, although
some subtle dierences have been detected. We have thus checked to some extent that
our experimental outcomes are not simply artifacts arising from our particular choice of
representation.
Unless otherwise noted, the simulation results reported in this paper are based on the
IPD machine representation shown in Figure 1. However, many of these results have also
been veried using Moore machines.
The genetic structure of each player is a bit string which encodes its IPD or Moore
machine. In the oating  - ! studies this genetic structure is augmented with either the
 or the ! values. This genetic structure determines its behavior under each possible set of
circumstances, but players with dierent genetic structures can be observationally equivalent
in the context of our IPD/CR game.
2
Formally, the IPD machines are characterized by a six-tuple (M;m
1
; S; s
1
; ; f), where: M  fc; dg is
the set consisting of the two possible moves for each PD game play, either cooperate c or defect d; m
1
2
M is an initial move; S is a nite set of internal states; s
1
2 S is the initial state resulting from the initial
move m
1
;  :S M ! M is an output function indicating the next move to be taken as a function of the
current state and the current move of one's opponent; and f :S M M ! S is a state transition function
indicating the next state as a function of the current state, the current move of one's opponent, and the next
move to be taken.
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C/C
1C 2
D/C
C/C
D/D
D/D
C/C
1C
Tit-For-Two-TatsTit-For-Tat
D/D
Figure 1: Two illustrative IPD machines, which are Mealy machines with xed initial states.
A player makes an initial move, either cooperate c or defect d, and then enters the initial
state 1; this initial move is indicated next to the arrow entering state 1. Once the player has
arrived at a current state, its next move is conditioned on the previous move of its partner as
well as on the current state. This move sequence then determines a transition to a new state.
A transition to a new state is indicated by an arrow, and the move sequence or sequences
that result in this transition are indicated beside the arrow in a move-slash-move format.
The previous move of the partner appears to the left of the slashmark and the next move of
the player appears to the right of the slashmark.
2.5 The Genetic Step
At the end of each tournament, the current generation of N players is transformed into a
new player population of the same size via a genetic algorithm that uses elitism, crossover,
and mutation; and this new population then engages in another IPD/CR tournament.
More precisely, at the beginning of the genetic step, each player in the current population
is assigned a tness equal to its average payo score per payo received. Copies of the X
most t players are retained in the next generation, and the bottom N   X players are
replaced by ospring of the top X players.
Parents are selected by means of a roulette wheel selection (Goldberg, 1989). Two
parents are selected (N   X)=2 times from the top X players with a probability directly
proportional to their relative tness. A player is allowed to mate with itself.
The recombination (crossover) of two IPD machine parents is accomplished as follows.
In the majority of our experiments, each machine has 16 states and is coded as a string
consisting of 161 bits. (The rst bit species the initial move, bits 2-129 are used for the
32 state transition arrows, each of which uses four bits to specify the next state, and bits
130-161 are used by the 32 arrow labels, which each use one bit to specify the move c or
d.) We generate a random variable q that is distributed uniformly over the discrete range
1; 2; : : : ; 161. The bits in positions q through 161 of the parental bit strings are exchanged
to obtain the bit strings for two ospring.
Next, the bit strings of these two ospring are subjected to mutation. For the initial move
and the 32 arrow labels, each bit is ipped with probability . For the 32 state transition
arrows, mutation of the state transition arrow (i.e. all four bits) occurs with probability ;
and, once a state transition arrow has been selected for mutation, a uniformly distributed
random value is selected from the discrete range 1; 2; : : : ; 16 and coded as a new four-bit
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representation for the state transition arrow.
3
3 Distribution of Behavior in the Initial Population
Our player populations are small, implying that only a small subset of possible IPD strategies
tends to be explored in each run. This is especially true given our small mutation rate. The
genetic material available in the initial population is therefore one crucial factor determining
the behavior of any specic run. In particular, at low values of ! the wallower ecologies
we describe in the next section are only observed when the expected number of mutually
cooperative individuals in the initial population is small. Moreover, our initial set of IPD
strategies is not chosen from a uniform distribution of all possible IPD strategies. Instead,
selecting each arrow and each arrow label from a uniform distribution creates an initial
distribution of IPD strategies that is highly biased towards simple strategies.
In this section we determine the probability that a randomly chosen IPD machine, as
described in section 2.4, exhibits a given type of self play in an IPD game play against a
clone of itself. We also determine the expected number of self-cooperators.
By construction, all moves in the self-play of an IPD machine are synchronized, either
both c or both d. Furthermore, some move and its associated state must eventually recur in
self play, after which the machine will loop endlessly through the interim sequence of moves
and states. The self-play behavior of these IPD machines can therefore be characterized by
a self-play string of the form A:B, where A and B are strings consisting of c and d moves
that are associated with state transitions. The string A represents a series of moves (and
state transitions) made initially in self play but not repeated, while B represents a series of
moves (and state transitions) that the IPD machine repeats thereafter. The string A always
contains at least the initial move since it is unrepeatable. Likewise, B always contains at
least one entry, a move whose associated state transition arrow points to the same state as
the state transition arrow associated with the last entry in A.
To illustrate the point that each entry of a self-play string represents both a move and
a state transition, consider the two self-play strings c:c and c:cc. Both represent pure self-
cooperation, but an IPD machine with the former string uses only one state in its self play
while one with the latter string uses at least two. This distinction is nontrivial at the level
of evolution. An examination of their diagrams shows that the self-play string of an IPD
machine with a c:c self-play string can only be aected by three point mutations (changing
either the initial or the second c, or changing the destination of the arrow marked c=c out of
the initial state) while the c:cc self-play string can be modied by ve dierent mutations.
Lemma 1. There are 2  (2n)
2n
distinct possible specications for an n-state IPD machine.
Proof:
The IPD machine has n states and an initial move. For each state, the IPD machine
must react to either a c or a d input, hence two arrows corresponding to these two possible
inputs must be specied. An arrow must go to one of n states and be labeled with one of
two moves, implying there are 2n dierent ways to specify a given arrow. The total number
of arrows in an n-state IPD machine is 2n, not counting the arrow pointing to the initial
3
The mutation process was incorrectly reported in Stanley et al. (1994) as consisting solely of point
mutations of the bit string.
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state, so we have (2n)
2n
ways to specify them. Multiplying this by the 2 possible initial
moves gives the desired formula. 2
Theorem 1.
Let S=A:B denote a self-play string, and let x; y; z 2 fc; dg denote, respectively, the rst
character of A, the last character of A, and the last character of B. Let n
c
and n
d
denote the
number of characters of type c and d in S, respectively. For any statement b, denote by [b]
the truth value of b: 1 if b is true; 0 if b is false. Then the number of n-state IPD machines
that have the self-play string A:B is:
(2n)
2n n
c
 n
d
 [y 6=z]+1

n!(n  1)!
(n  n
c
+ [z = c])!(n  n
d
+ [z = d])!
: (3)
Proof:
We start by counting the number of ways to place the arrows labeled with the entries of
the self-play string.
The rst entry of the self play string involves no choice; its arrow points to state 1 and
is labeled x. For each subsequent entry of the self-play string, apart from the last entry, the
arrow labeled with that entry leads from the current state; and the state to which the arrow
points may be freely chosen from those states that do not yet have an arrow with the same
label pointing at them. The arrow for the last entry in the self-play string must point to the
same state as the arrow corresponding to the move immediately preceding the colon in the
self-play string.
This means we make an ordered choice of (n
c
 [x = c] [z = c]) states out of (n [x = c])
to be the head states of the arrows corresponding to cooperation and an ordered choice of
(n
d
  [x = d]   [z = d]) states out of (n   [x = d]) to be the head states of the arrows
corresponding to defection. The subtraction of [x = c] and [x = d] from the set of available
states takes into account that the initial move uses up one of the moves that could otherwise
be associated with the initial state. The subtraction of [z = c] and [z = d] from the set of
arrows that need head states reects the fact that the head state of the last arrow is dictated
by the position of the colon in S. Since states may be the heads of a c arrow and/or a d
arrow, the choices are independent and the total number of choices is
(n  [x = c])!(n  [x = d])!
(n  n
c
+ [z = c])!(n  n
d
+ [z = d])!
: (4)
Since exactly one of [x = c] and [x = d] is 1, the numerator can be simplied to n!(n 1)!.
This transforms the above to
n!(n  1)!
(n  n
c
+ [z = c])!(n  n
d
+ [z = d])!
: (5)
Any n-state IPD machine has a total of 2n arrows, not counting the arrow associated
with the initial move. We explicitly chose the description of n
c
+ n
d
  1 of these arrows in
the course of laying out the self-play string. If y = z, then we have chosen enough arrows
to ensure that the IPD machine will exhibit the desired self play; but, if y 6= z, then we
must ensure that the head state of the state transition arrow associated with y transits to
the same next state, and is labeled with the same move, regardless of whether the previous
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move was a c or a d (i.e., regardless of whether this head state is being entered from y or
from z). This requires we ll in one additional arrow description.
Thus, the total number of arrow descriptions lled in during the course of specifying
the self-play string is n
c
+ n
d
+ [y 6= z]   1. This leaves 2n   n
c
  n
d
  [y 6= z] + 1 arrow
descriptions to be lled in. Since there are 2n dierent ways to ll in each arrow description,
we see that there are
(2n)
2n n
c
 n
d
 [y 6=z]+1
(6)
additional choices not associated with specifying the self-play string. Multiplying the choices
yields the desired formula (3). 2
Corollary 1.
If n
c
, n
d
, x, y, and z are as in Theorem 1, then the probability of a randomly-generated
IPD machine having a given self-play string A:B is
n!(n  1)!
2  (2n)
(n
c
+n
d
+[y 6=z] 1)
(n  n
c
+ [z = c])!(n  n
d
+ [z = d])!
: (7)
Proof:
Divide equation 3 by the total number of possible IPD machines computed in Lemma 1.
2
Call an IPD machine self-cooperative or self-defecting if its self-play string consists en-
tirely of c or d moves, respectively. The next result is valid for both self-cooperative and
self-defecting IPD machines:
Theorem 2.
The probability that a randomly-generated IPD machine is self-cooperative is
n
X
l=1
(n  1)!  l
2  (2n)
l
(n  l)!
: (8)
Proof:
With an initial move that must come before the colon, and up to n states corresponding
to other potential moves in the self-play string, at least one of which must come after the
colon, we see that the number l of entries in a self-play string consisting entirely of c moves
is in the range 2  l  n+1. Moreover, in a string with l such entries, there are l  1 places
to put the colon.
The index of summation will run across the number of possible entries in a completely
cooperative self-play string, minus one. For a given l and colon position, formula (7) may
be lled in with n
c
= l, n
d
= 0, and x = y = z = c to yield the probability
n!(n  1)!
2  (2n)
(l 1)
(n  l+ 1)!(n)!
: (9)
Since there are l   1 places the colon could be placed, the probability of an IPD machine
having a self-play string with l cooperates and no defects is, after cancellation,
(n  1)!(l  1)
2  (2n)
(l 1)
(n  l + 1)!
: (10)
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n Probability Expectation n Probability Expectation
1 0.25 7.5 12 0.0615 1.8456
2 0.1875 5.625 13 0.0578 1.735
3 0.1528 4.5833 14 0.0546 1.6373
4 0.1299 3.8965 15 0.0517 1.5502
5 0.1134 3.402 16 0.0491 1.4721
6 0.1009 3.0259 17 0.0467 1.4016
7 0.091 2.7287 18 0.0446 1.3377
8 0.0829 2.4872 19 0.0426 1.2795
9 0.0762 2.2866 20 0.0409 1.2262
10 0.0706 2.1171 25 0.0338 1.0154
Table 2: The probability that a randomly generated n-state IPD machine will be self-
cooperative, and the expected number of self-cooperative ones out of thirty.
If we then sum over the possible values of l and correct the index to run from 1 to n, we
obtain formula (8). 2
For later purposes, Table 2 computes the expected number of self-cooperative n-state
IPD machines in a randomly-chosen population of size thirty.
4 Simulation Findings: Overview
In preliminary IPD/CR simulation studies reported in Stanley et al. (1994), we found that
the overall emergence of cooperation was faster with choice and refusal than with round-
robin partner selection as used in Miller (1989). As well, the initial dip in overall average
tness was either much shallower or missing entirely. Although a large number of ecologies
emerged that were essentially mutually cooperative, other ecologies had an average tness
that remained nearly constant for many generations at levels below the mutual cooperation
payo, or which displayed other fairly regular payo patterns. Interestingly, when we overlaid
the average tnesses from dierent runs at the same parameter values, the average tnesses
often clustered around a small number of values.
These general ndings continue to hold for the more extensive studies reported in the
present paper. Indeed, the enhancement of the emergence of cooperation appears even
more dramatic when we compare our results to random rather than to round-robin partner
selection, a more appropriate comparison because the total number of games played is more
similar. In this section we present a brief overview of these and other simulation ndings. A
more detailed discussion is given in Section 5.
When partners are chosen randomly and no refusal is allowed, many populations never
evolve to full cooperation. On the other hand, only a small fraction evolve to full defection;
the rest go to meta-stable states which lie between these two cases. As depicted in Figure
2(b), these eects show up visually as either noisy horizontal lines or thin bands when the
average tnesses of each of the forty runs are graphically superimposed. Some of these
are easy to understand: 3.0 reects fully cooperative play; 2.8 is a population in which
each player defects exactly once against each other player; and so on. The overall average
tness (i.e., the average of the average tness across the forty runs) stays well below 3.0, the
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Number of Players N = 30
Number of Generations (Tournaments) G  50
Number of Iterations per Tournament I = 150
Initial Expected Payo: 
0
= 3.0
Minimum Tolerance Level:  = 1.6
Refusal Payo: R = 1.0
Wallower Payo: W = 1.6
Memory Weight: ! = 0.7
Number of Elite X = 20
Mutation Probability  = 5/1000
Table 3: Parameter Settings for the Standard IPD/CR Scenario
full-cooperation payo (see Figure 2(a)).
Contrast this with Figure 3, which depicts the average tnesses of forty dierent runs
at the standard IPD/CR parameter settings specied in Table 3. Once again, not all pop-
ulations evolve to full cooperation. However, nearly all of these partially noncooperative
populations evolve to a situation where, on average, each player defects only once against
each other player. Thus, while horizontal bands are evident in both Figure 2(b) and Figure
3(b), the average tnesses for the latter case tend to cluster in just two narrow regions; and
the overall average tnesses achieved for the standard IPD/CR scenario are higher than for
random choice.
Figure 3 illustrates a commonly observed conguration for average tnesses in the evo-
lutionary IPD/CR: values clustered fairly tightly into a small number of narrow regions. For
some parameter settings, however, the number of of these regions can be large and more
diusely distributed. Also, choice and refusal can lead to situations where the players defect
against each other a small number of times and then cease game play altogether, becoming
wallowers. The latter situation happens, for example, when the standard IPD/CR scenario
is perturbed in any of the following three ways: the refusal payo is increased until being
refused becomes an attractive alternative to mutual defection; the memory weight is low-
ered until cooperators refuse to tolerate even a single defection; or the wallower payo is
increased to a level lying only slightly below the mutual cooperation level. The rst two
cases are illustrated by Figures 4 and 5, respectively.
Despite attaining similar average tnesses, the populations with average tnesses in any
one region consist of genetically diverse players with interaction patterns peculiarly adapted
to the choice and refusal mechanism. For example, as described further in Section 5, the
source of the spiking in average tnesses from 2.69 to 3.0 observed in Figure 3 is an intricate
dance between one set of initially rapacious but ultimately love-struck players (\Bobs") and
another set of temptingly cooperative players (\Raquels"). A more detailed examination of
the fascinating social network structures arising in the evolutionary IPD/CR is given in a
companion paper (Smucker et al., 1994). These structures are strongly reminiscent of the
social network structures observed in real world settings.
If the choice and refusal parameters  and ! are allowed to evolve over time along with
the players' IPD strategies, then populations typically evolve to be intolerant of anyone
who defects even once against a cooperator. Interestingly, as discussed more carefully in
Section 5, the populations with evolved  and ! values tend to achieve average tnesses lying
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Figure 2: Random choice evolved for 500 generations. Each player chooses exactly one
partner at random on each of the 150 iterations comprising an IPD tournament. (a) The
overall average tness achieved by successive generations across 40 runs. The dashed lines
(error bounds) show this overall average tness plus or minus one standard deviation. (b)
Each line shows the average tness achieved by successive generations during one of the 40
runs. Note the wide spread and the horizontal bands. The bands tend to occur because
populations become genetically homogeneous and mutants tend to do poorly.
between those of populations with xed choice and refusal parameters and those attained by
populations using random partner choice. However, the variety of behaviors observed in the
populations with evolved  and ! values is just as great as for the populations with xed
choice and refusal parameters.
5 Simulation Studies: Detailed Results
In this section we detail a variety of simulation studies that have been conducted to explore
the sensitivity of IPD/CR evolutionary outcomes to changes in key parameters. We start by
explaining the concept of a tness region, used below to aid the reporting of our simulation
ndings.
5.1 Fitness Regions
As seen in Section 4, the average tnesses achieved by successive generations in runs of the
evolutionary IPD/CR from dierent initial random seeds tend to cluster around a small
number of levels. We refer to these levels as regions D
0
, D
1
,: : : . Region D
n
is the cluster
of average tnesses roughly centered around the average tness achieved by a homogeneous
(genetically identical) population whose self-play string A:B consists of an initial string A of
n defections followed by a string B consisting entirely of cooperations. Thus, region D
0
is the
tness cluster roughly centered around the average tness 3.0 of a homogeneous population
with a self-play string c:c : : : c, region D
1
is roughly centered around the average tness of a
homogeneous population with self-play string d:c : : : c, and so forth.
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Figure 3: IPD/CR evolved for 500 generations with all parameters at their standard scenario
levels. As in Figure 2, each player chooses at most one partner in each iteration. (a) Overall
average tness across forty runs and error bounds. (b) Average tness achieved by successive
generations for 40 individual runs. Note how few tness levels are achieved in comparison to
Figure 2. The jumps in average tness from the tness region near 2.69 to a level above the
mutual cooperation tness region at 3.0 are observed frequently, and indicate the Raquel-
and-the-Bobs phenomenon discussed in the text.
Figure 4: IPD/CR with a high refusal payo (R = 2:75.). All other parameter settings are at
standard scenario levels. (a) Overall average tness across forty runs and error bounds. (b)
Average tnesses for forty individual runs. The high refusal payo is so attractive that some
runs gets trapped in a wallower situation where each player defects against each other player
four times and thereafter collects wallower payos. Every time a more cooperative player
appears, the defectors take advantage of it to collect refusal payos; the cooperator itself
scores poorly and immediately dies out. The appearance of such cooperators is indicated by
spikes in the average tnesses.
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Figure 5: IPD/CR with low memory weight (! = 0:4). All other parameter settings are at
standard scenario levels. (a) Overall average tnesses across forty runs and error bounds. (b)
Average tnesses for forty individual runs. Here cooperators do not accept any defections,
and mutual defectors only play each other twice before preferring to become solitary. Also,
some populations become trapped in wallower situations for many generations, with mutant
cooperators achieving even lower payos than their defecting relatives.
Note that the precise average tness anchoring a region D
j
with j > 0 depends on the
IPD/CR parameter settings. For example, given the standard settings in Table 3 with I
= 150 iterations between genetic steps, the average tness anchoring D
1
is 2.69; but this
average tness increases monotonically to 3:0 as I becomes arbitrarily large. Also, the player
populations of the ecologies lying within a particular tness region can vary enormously from
one another; and, even for any one of these ecologies, the successive generations are rarely
homogeneous. For example, region D
1
may contain ecologies consisting of a homogeneous
population of players having a self-play string cd:c, ecologies consisting of a mixed popu-
lation of players having self-play strings d:c and dc:c, as well as ecologies consisting of a
homogeneous population having a self-play string d:c
Finally, the tness cluster centered roughly around the wallower payo W will be
referred to as the wallower region. The ecologies falling in this region typically consist
of player populations that initially engage in mutual defections and ultimately end up as
wallowers.
5.2 Sensitivity to Changes in the IPD/CR Parameters
A series of sensitivity experiments were conducted for various subsets of the IPD/CR param-
eters, keeping all remaining parameters at their standard IPD/CR scenario settings as listed
in Table 3. In all experiments except the oating  case reported later, the wallower payo
W was set equal to  .
4
As will be seen below, an important implication of these sensitivity
experiments is that the IPD/CR parameters  , !, and 
0
have closely coupled eects on the
evolution of player populations.
4
Intuitively, it makes little sense for a player to refuse (accept) an oer whose expected payo is higher
(lower) than the expected payo W from cessation of game play.
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Figure 6 describes how the mean and standard deviation of average tnesses change
when the minimum tolerance level  , the memory weight !, the initial expected payo 
0
,
and the refusal payo R are varied one at a time from their standard scenario settings.
For each tested parameter conguration, forty runs were made using forty dierent initial
random seeds, resulting in forty distinct ecologies, and each run consisted of fty generations
of players. The mean average tnesses m for the nal twenty-ve generations are indicated
by squares, and the dispersion of each mean m is indicated by an error bar giving a range
of plus or minus one standard deviation  about this mean.
5
As seen in part (d) of Figure 6, m drops precipitously in response to increases in the
refusal payo, R, because nearly all populations evolve into wallower ecologies. Surprisingly,
however, parts (a) through (c) indicate that increases in  , !, or 
0
have little eect on m. In
particular, the player populations for the nal twenty-ve generations are more cooperative
on average than the populations evolved with random partner choice; compare Figure 2. As
seen in part (b), this remains true even when the memory weight ! is set at 0:9, implying
that players only gradually move away from the common expected payo 
0
they initially
have for all potential game partners.
6
In contrast, the average standard deviation, , tends to increase with increases in 
0
or
R, and also to vary signicantly in response to increases in  and !, rst decreasing and
then increasing. These ndings are consistent with the following observations. With low  ,
high !, and high 
0
, although D
0
and D
1
tness regions are evident, many ecologies persist
outside these regions in no discernible pattern. As illustrated in Figure 7, this results in a
large dispersion in average tnesses. In contrast, for more intermediate parameter settings,
near the standard scenario values and for low 
0
, almost all ecologies lie within either the
D
0
or the D
1
tness regions, implying a relatively smaller dispersion in average tnesses.
Finally, for high  and low !, the ecologies tend to divide between the cooperative tness
region D
0
and the wallower tness region, resulting once again in a rather large dispersion
in average tnesses.
Table 4 provides a more detailed description of the one-parameter sensitivity outcomes
summarized in Figure 6 for  , !, 
0
, and R. Caution must be exercised in interpreting these
results; the somewhat dierent outcomes observed in the four dierent forty-run experiments
undertaken at standard scenario parameter settings (see  = 1.6, ! = 0.7, 
0
= 3.0, and R =
1.0) indicate that our sample size is too small to ensure that all interesting phenomena that
can occur at a particular parameter setting are actually in evidence. Table 5 reports results
for a two-parameter sensitivity study in which  and 
0
were varied together. As before,
forty runs were made for each tested parameter conguration, and each run consisted of fty
generations.
5
The means and standard deviations m and  are determined in the followingmanner. For each parameter
setting, we rst determine the average tness m(e; g) attained by each of the forty ecologies e during each
generation g = 1; : : : ; 50. We then calculate the mean m(g) of the average tnesses m(e; g) across the forty
ecologies e for each g. As seen in Figures 2(a)-5(a), the means m(g) tend to level out by about the twenty-
fth generation, with only small subsequent variations. Consequently, we determine the overall mean m by
taking the average of the means m(g) across generations g = 25; : : : ; 50. Also, for each parameter setting,
we calculate the average standard deviation  of the average tnesses m(e; g) achieved by the forty ecologies
e over generations g = 25; : : : ; 50.
6
When ! is set at 1:0, all players remain indierent concerning their choice of partner since the initial
expected payo, 
0
, is never updated. The value ! = 1:0 was used to generate the random choice results
reported in Figure 2.
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Figure 6: Sensitivity of average tnesses to parameter variations. For each indicated param-
eter setting, the square indicates the mean average tness achieved by the forty ecologies
over the nal twenty-ve generations, and the error bar gives a (two standard deviations)
range of dispersion about this mean.
16
 = W minimum phenomena ! minimum phenomena
0.2 1.0 N;D
0
; nD
1
;W 0.10 1.5 D
0
;W
0.4 1.0 N;D
0
;D
1
;D
2
; L
2
0.20 1.5 D
0
;W
0.6 1.0 D
0
; nD
1
; N;O
1
0.25 1.5 D
0
;W
0.8 1.3 D
0
; nD
1
; N;D
2
1
0.30 1.4 D
0
;D
1
;W
1.0 1.5 D
0
; nD
1
; N 0.35 1.4 D
0
;D
1
;W
1.2 1.6 N;D
0
; nD
1
; C
1
0.40 1.4 D
0
; nD
1
;W
1.4 1.3 N;D
0
; nD
1
; J
2
0.50 1.4 D
0
;D
1
1
; O
2
;W;C
1
1.6 1.7 D
0
; nD
1
; J
2
0.60 1.3 D
0
;D
1
;D
2
2
;D
3
1
; L
1.8 1.6 D
0
; nD
1
; J;D
2
1
0.65 1.4 N;nD
1
; C
1
2.0 1.7 nD
0
; nD
1
; J;O;C
1
0.70 1.6 D
0
; nD
1
; J
1
2.2 1.8 D
0
;D
1
1
;W
1
0.75 1.3 N;nD
0
; nD
1
; nD
2
2.4 1.9 D
0
;W
1
0.80 1.6 nD
1
; nD
0
; nD
2
2.8 2.4 D
0
;W 0.90 1.3 N;nD
1
; nD
0

0
R
1.6 2.5 D
0
;D
1
0.00 1.2 D
0
;D
1
; N; J
1.8 2.4 D
0
;W
1
; O
1
0.25 1.5 D
0
; nD
1
; J;D
4
1
2.0 2.0 D
0
0.50 1.3 D
0
; nD
1
; J
2.2 2.2 D
0
;D
1
2
0.75 1.3 D
0
; nD
1
; J;N
2.4 2.3 nD
0
1.00 1.6 D
0
; nD
1
;D
2
1
; J
4
; O
2.6 1.4 nD
0
;D
1
1
1.25 1.3 D
0
;D
1
;D
2
1
; J
2
; O
2
2.8 1.6 D
0
;D
1
1
; N 1.50 1.3 D
0
;D
1
; J;N
3.0 1.6 D
0
; nD
1
; J
2
; O
1
1.75 1.4 D
0
; nD
1
;D
2
1
; N; J
2
3.2 1.2 D
0
;D
1
; L
1
; O
1
2.00 1.5 D
0
; nD
1
; N
3.4 1.2 D
0
;D
1
;D
2
2
; N 2.25 1.2 N;D
0
; nD
1
;W
1
3.6 1.2 D
0
; nD
1
; nD
2
2.50 1.2 D
0
; nD
1
; N;W
2
4.0 1.6 D
0
; nD
1
; N 2.75 1.2 W;D
0
;D
1
;D
3
2
;D
2
1
; J
3.00 1.2 W;D
0
1
; N
Table 4: One-parameter sensitivity results. \Minimum" is a rough estimate of the minimum
average tness achieved by the forty ecologies after an initial transient stage, and gives a
crude sense of the level of cooperation evinced. The phenomena columns indicate the various
behaviors observed for the forty ecologies, roughly in order of their frequency. D
n
= tness
region n,W = wallower region, C an ecology which persists for a long time whose dominant
subpopulation has a self-play string with a short cyclic section, and O = other ecologies with
nearly constant tness across many generations. Also, N = noisy average tness plots with
no discernible patterns, J = spiking observed in average tness, and L = a late-appearing
wallower ecology. A small n in front of a phenomenon indicates that it was evident amidst
some amount of noise, and a subscript m on a phenomenon indicates that only m cases were
observed.
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Figure 7: Experimental ndings with low minimum tolerance level ( = 0:40). All other
parameter settings are at standard scenario levels. (a) Overall average tness across forty
runs, and error bounds. (b) Average tnesses for forty individual runs.
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Table 5: Two-parameter sensitivity results:  and 
0
varied together. See the caption of
Table 4 for a key. Each box reports the minimum average tness for generations 25-50 as
well as key observed phenomena.
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The parameter 
0
determines the initial reactions of the players to each other. As seen
in Tables 4 and 5, signicant changes in evolutionary outcomes often occur when 
0
deviates
from the mutual cooperation payo 3.0. A value of 
0
greater than 3.0 encourages players
to experiment by playing games with many new partners, while a value of 
0
lower than 3.0
encourages players to stick with those they have already played.
The exogenously chosen initial expected payo 
0
can be dead wrong as an assessment of
a potential partner. Therefore, a player's memory as embodied in its current expected payos
can be tantamount to fantasy. The memory weight !, which weights past expected payos
relative to newly obtained payos in each player's updating algorithm (2), can thus play
an important role in osetting or amplifying unwarranted optimism or pessimism stemming
from an inappropriate setting for 
0
.
In particular, given standard scenario settings for other parameter values, dramatic
changes occur in evolutionary outcomes when ! is set low enough that any defection against
a cooperation results in immediate refusal of all future PD-game oers. As seen in Table 4,
the emergence of wallower ecologies is then common. On the other hand, ! = 1 results in
random partner choice, and it might therefore be anticipated that the behaviors observed at
high ! values will mimic those observed for random partner choice. However, it is only at
the very highest tested value of !, 0.9, that we see any hint of the wide dispersion in average
tnesses that occurs for random partner choice, as depicted in Figure 2(b); and, even for
this high ! value, no ecologies inhabiting the tness regions D
n
with n > 2 are observed.
The sensitivity results reported in Table 4 for the refusal payo R reveal two regions of
distinct behavior, splitting roughly at R = 2:0. When R is below 2.0, refusal is avoided by
the players and wallower ecologies are absent. As R increases, however, players tantalized
by high R payos often defect their way into a wallower ecology. Thereafter, they only
obtain R payos when the population is invaded by a mutant cooperator.
In the next several subsections we examine more closely the behavioral phenomena high-
lighted in Tables 4 and 5.
5.2.1 The Cooperative Fitness Region D
0
Ecologies whose average tnesses lie in the D
0
region consist largely of players engaging in
mutual cooperation, apart from an occasional mutant. As indicated in Tables 4 and 5, such
ecologies have appeared for almost every parameter setting we have tested.
7
Indeed, for most
parameter settings, a substantial number of ecologies approach this tness region within the
rst fteen generations. In general, the greater the fraction of ecologies that lie within the
tness region D
0
, the more time they spend there and the higher is their attained average
tness, m.
When all players engage in mutual cooperation, only three types of player interaction
patterns are possible. If the initial expected payo 
0
equals the mutual cooperation payo
3:0, then potential PD game partners always have an expected payo equal to 3:0 and each
player is indierent concerning whom it plays. In this case the partner selection mechanism
reduces to random choice. If 
0
is greater than 3:0, players keep selecting new partners
in a round-robin fashion as they experience disappointment from their lower than expected
7
For the one-parameter sensitivity results, the only exceptions were when ! = 0:65 or when R was set
higher than 3:0; for R = 3:0, only one such ecology appeared in forty runs. No exceptions were found for
the two-parameter sensitivity studies for 
0
and  .
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mutual cooperation payos. If 
0
is less than 3:0, each player latches onto the rst individual
it plays since its updated expected payo for this partner will rise above the payo 
0
it
expects from each other partner.
The D
0
tness region is visually noisy when ecologies persistently move in and out of
the region, or when other ecologies persist at nearby average tness levels. This situation is
indicated by nD
0
in Tables 4 and 5.
5.2.2 The Wallower Fitness Region
The next most easily understood tness region is the wallower region. The ecologies falling
within this region typically comprise players that initially defect against all other players,
ultimately decide that each other player is intolerable, and thereafter collect only wallower
payos. Such ecologies are easily detected because they persist for a long time with an
average tness that is near the wallower payo W .
Two situations encourage wallower ecologies to emerge and persist: positive incentive
(a high W or R value); and quick refusal of defectors (a high  value). In simulation
experiments in which neither of these holds, we rarely observe the emergence of wallower
ecologies. On the other hand, when R is set suciently high, almost all ecologies in our
sensitivity experiments evolve into wallower ecologies. Also, keeping W set equal to  ,
and setting  high, some (but not all) ecologies evolve into wallower ecologies. It may
seem counterintuitive that a high R value results in more wallower ecologies than a high
 value since synchronized play behavior is commonly observed, and players engaging in
such behavior never receive refusal payos from each other. However, with a high R value,
defectors score very well whenever cooperators are present. Thus defectors tend to take over
the population and prevent mutant cooperative players from invading.
Given 
0
= 3.0 and  > 2.1, with ! set at its standard scenario value of 0:7, a cooperating
player will immediately refuse all further play with a player who defects on its rst move
against it. This immediate refusal in response to an initial sucker payo of 0 increases the
probability that a wallower ecology will emerge. It also suggests why, in general, wallower
ecologies are observed in the two-parameter experiments of Table 5 only for the higher
values of  for each given value of 
0
; for the appearance of wallower ecologies in this table
is roughly tracing out the boundary in the 
0
{ plane between immediate refusal and no
immediate refusal in response to an initial 0 payo, given ! = 0.7.
When 
0
< 3.0, however, the explanation for the emergence of wallower ecologies is ac-
tually more subtle than this discussion suggests, for a player's expected payo then increases
with each new mutual cooperation payo, 3, that it receives. Thus, a sucker payo, 0, or
a mutual defection payo, 1, received on the rst move with another player might result
in refusal of all further play, but refusal of further play might not occur if such payos are
only received following a string of mutual cooperation payos. For example, as indicated in
Table 5, wallower ecologies were not observed when 
0
and  were both set at 1:6, even
though a 0 payo on either the rst or the second move always evokes immediate refusal in
this case (but a 0 payo on the third move need not).
In general, our ndings suggest that wallower ecologies primarily occur in the region of
the parameter space for  , !, and 
0
where players are relatively intolerant of defections. In
order to quantify this intolerance region, let (Z) denote the expected payo that a player i
has for another player j after receiving a string of payos Z from j, and let Q(Z) = (Z)= .
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By construction, player i will refuse all further game oers from player j if and only if Q(Z)
is less than 1, implying that i nds j intolerable. Given any Z, the  , 
0
, and ! parameter
space can then be partitioned into intolerance and tolerance regions characterized by Q(Z)
< 1 and Q(Z)  1, respectively.
Our simulation ndings regarding the emergence of wallower ecologies in the case 
0
<
3.0 can now be summarized as follows. Using fL;D;C;Hg to denote the PD game payos
f0; 1; 3; 5g, wallower ecologies rarely evolve in simulations for which the IPD/CR parameters
satisfy 
0
< C, Q(L) < 1, Q(CL) < 1, and Q(CCL)  1. However, we observe at least some
ecologies evolving into wallower ecologies when 
0
< C and Q(CCL) < 1. For example,
given ! = 0.6 and  = W = 1.6, the value Q(CCL) = 1 occurs at 
0
= 2.07. In simulation
experiments with ! = 0.6 and  = W = 1.6, wallower ecologies emerged when 
0
was set
at 1.90 or 2.05 but not when 
0
was set at 2.10 or 2.20.
We also hypothesize that the probability an ecology will evolve into a wallower ecology
depends in part on the initial player population. In particular, suppose parameter values
are set so that players in the initial population that do not mutually cooperate are rather
quickly reduced to wallowers and any single cooperator cannot out-score defectors in an
otherwise defecting population. Then defectors will take over unless there are two or more
cooperators in the initial population; for any time a single cooperator appears via mutation
and crossover, it will immediately fail to propagate. On the other hand, if a single cooperator
can out-score an otherwise defecting initial population, then cooperators will eventually have
ospring with whom they can cooperate, do even better, and take over.
Interestingly, it follows from Table 2 that initial populations whose players have sixteen-
state IPD machine representations include on average only 1.47 players whose self-play string
is purely cooperative, whereas populations whose players have one-state IPD machine rep-
resentations have a much greater expected number of self-play cooperators, 7.5. The proba-
bility that an initial population will have more than one player that consistently cooperates
with large numbers of other players is thus much greater in the one-state case. It follows
from the previous discussion that the evolution of wallower ecologies should be a more
common occurrence in our sixteen-state simulations than in our one-state simulations, and
this is certainly supported by our simulation ndings. As will be discussed further below,
no wallower ecologies have been observed in our one-state simulations.
It also follows that wallower ecologies will be less likely to emerge when the population
size is increased. This hypothesis was tested by choosing two of the parameter settings where
wallower ecologies were seen, but incentives were nonexistent: namely, ! = 0:3 and ! = 0:4
with other parameters at standard values. The population size was doubled to N = 60,
giving an expected number of 2.94 self-cooperators in the initial population. The number
of iterations was increased to 400 to ensure that all players had a chance to test all other
players. As expected, no wallower ecologies were seen.
5.2.3 The Intermediate Fitness Region D
1
In our one-parameter and two-parameter sensitivity experiments, the D
1
region is absent for
low or intermediate values of the initial expected payo, 
0
, or for parameter settings where
mutual defection results in immediate play stoppage|for example, where  is at least 2:4
and all other parameters are set at standard scenario levels. Otherwise, at least some hint
of the region is evident, even when the number I of iterations in the standard scenario is
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increased to 400 so that the average tness anchoring D
1
is close to the average tness 3.0
that (always) anchors D
0
.
The D
1
region encompasses a whole host of ecologies in addition to the canonical case
where players mutually defect once but otherwise mutually cooperate. Many D
1
ecologies
consist of two or more distinct, repeatedly-interacting subpopulations that appear to be
meta-stable in the following sense: they emerge and persist for many generations, and they
resist invasion by a large range of mutants.
The social networks formed by the populations inhabiting the D
1
ecologies were studied
by considering the players as nodes in a fully connected graph. An edge in the graph
represented an interaction between two players, and was initially assigned a zero strength.
The strength of an edge connecting any two players increased by one each time the players
engaged in a PD game. To obtain a clearer visualization of the more persistent social
interactions, edge strengths that fell below a certain minimum number at the end of a
simulation run were set to zero and the remaining edge strengths were set to one.
Our simulation studies show that the social networks (graphs) determined in this manner
for D
1
ecologies can take on an astonishing variety of forms: small, isolated networks; linked
stars, where a few cooperative players are chosen by all other players; unlinked stars, where
the players forming the center nodes of the stars nd each other intolerable; a completely
connected central network of players together with an outer layer of players, each linked
to only one player in the central network; and tree-shaped networks. In many cases, the
rst ten to fty iterations are used by players to \get to know each other," after which the
social network settles into a seemingly stable conguration. In other cases, however, a social
network may persist in one form for a number of generations and then transit to a dierent
form, or it may simply never settle down. New social networks are still being discovered.
As these ndings suggest, the D
1
region tends to be thick: most of the ecologies in this
region do not have an average tness at the canonical D
1
value, just one close to this value.
Indeed, one of the ecologies that commonly adds mass and visual impact to the D
1
region,
Raquel-and-the- Bobs, has a tness trace that leaps out of the region at random intervals to
slightly above 3.0 and then falls back. See, for example, Figure 3. A more detailed study of
this and other social networks arising in the evolutionary IPD/CR can be found in Smucker
et al. (1994), but a general description of Raquel-and-the-Bobs will now be given.
This whimsically-named ecology is best described as the intertwining of two interaction
patterns repeatedly arising from one another. The rst interaction pattern occurs when
an essentially homogeneous population of \Bobs" evolves. Each Bob has a self-play string
containing a single defection at or near the beginning of the self play string, e.g. d:c, and
the property that a point mutation or crossover can easily produce a \Raquel" which is
self-cooperative and which also cooperates at all times with a Bob. The population of Bobs
obtains an average tness in the D
1
region. A population of Bobs will play with a typical
search and latch pattern { a Bob resents the initial defection and keeps searching until it
has played all other players once. After that point, it will latch onto the player it has played
the largest number of times.
The Bobs hum along from generation to generation until one of their ospring is a
Raquel, ushering in the second interaction pattern. The payo of 5 that a Bob receives from
a Raquel when Bob defects and Raquel cooperates causes each Bob to latch onto Raquel as
soon as it nds it.
The result of this is that Raquel plays a large number of cooperative games after the
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Figure 8: An illustration of a Raquel-and-the-Bobs social network with three Raquels.
initial defect with every Bob in the population and ends up, due to unavoidable stochastic
Bob-on-Bob defections in the initial play, with the highest tness. The population average
tness also rises { not all possible Bob-on-Bob defections happen anymore { and a spike in
the tness trace starts.
Raquel has the highest tness, so it has children. Since the expressed part of Raquel's
genome is usually quite small, the probability is high that Raquel's ospring will also be
Raquels. As a result, the number of Raquels increases. With multiple Raquels, a Bob nds
a Raquel sooner and gets fewer defection payos from other Bobs. Even though a Bob wants
to latch onto the rst Raquel it nds, the Raquels keep searching the population (at least
when 
0
 3). Thus each Bob eventually nds all the Raquels and obtains the payo of
5 once for each Raquel. As a result, the population average tness is raised again. Once
enough Raquels have entered the population, the Bobs' tnesses surpass Raquels'. At this
point, given our elitism in reproduction, the Raquels are always decimated and usually wiped
out. This causes the falling leg of the spike in the average tness trace. Figure 8 shows the
interaction of a population when there are three Raquels.
5.2.4 Other Phenomena
Reviewing Tables 4 and 5, it is apparent that the tness region D
2
is much less in evidence
than the wallower region or the regions D
0
and D
1
. Typically, only one or two ecologies
persist in this region even when it is observed. As for D
1
, the D
2
ecologies that have been
observed exhibit a wide variety of behaviors. The tness region D
3
appears to be even rarer
than D
2
, perhaps because three defections often leads to play stoppages. Cyclic ecologies, in
which all or almost all individuals have a short repeating self-play string with both c's and
d's (e.g. c : dc) also occur, but seem to be rare at any parameter setting.
When the standard scenario was perturbed by lowering ! to 0.5, a particularly interesting
ecology appeared whose average payo persisted near 2.0 over the nal twenty generations.
Examining the player population for the very last generation, we discovered that the players
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were alternating mutual defections and mutual cooperations with each other, resulting in
sequences of payos of the form (:::; 1; 3; 1; 3; :::). This population contained two subpopula-
tions, each of whose members preferred partners from the other group.
Sometimes an ecology will transit to a wallower ecology after persisting for some time in
a more cooperative mode. As indicated in Table 4, these rare late wallower ecologies occur
at dierent parameter values than the usual wallower ecologies, for reasons that remain
unclear.
5.3 Sensitivity to Potential Behavioral Complexity
To test the sensitivity of our evolutionary outcomes to changes in the maximum permitted
complexity of the players' IPD strategies, the number of states in the IPD machines for these
strategies was reduced from sixteen to one. To our surprise, many of the novel behaviors
resulting from the introduction of choice and refusal in the evolutionary IPD are not aected
by this apparently severe constraint. For one-state IPD machines,D
2
ecologies cannot arise;
and wallower ecologies do not emerge at high  values with W set equal to  , apparently
because the fraction of cooperators in the initial population is high; cf. Table 2. However,
D
1
ecologies (in particular, Raquel-and-the-Bobs) are possible and have been observed.
5.4 Floating  and ! Studies
In some studies, rather than assuming that the players were characterized by xed commonly-
shared values for the minimum tolerance level  and the memory weight !, we instead let
these parameters constitute part of each player's genetic structure. For these simulations,
we used the Moore machine representation for the players' IPD strategies. Sixteen bits for
each of the two parameters were added to the bit strings used to code the Moore machine
representations. These additional 16 bits were used to partition the allowable ranges for 
and ! into 2
16
intervals. For the oating  study, the allowable range was set from 0 to 3;
for the oating ! study, the allowable range was set from 0 to 1.
Figure 9 shows what happened when  was added to the genetic structure of each player,
with all other parameters set at standard scenario levels (including W = 1:6). We made 196
runs from dierent initial random seeds, with each run consisting of 2000 generations. The
average  across the 196 runs evolved to approximately 2:1. [Recall that  = 2:1 is the value
above which any sucker payo 0 results in further refusal of play.] Moreover, for all but
the initial generations, the overall average tness across the 196 runs hovered around 2:8.
Surprisingly, this is generally lower than the overall average tness achieved in the standard
scenario case with  held xed at W = 1:6; see part (a) of Figure 3.
When the ecologies were examined individually, however, we found once again a rich
variety of behaviors. The average values of  for individual ecologies have an interesting
distribution (see Fig. 9(b)). Average  values tend to cluster in two intervals at later gener-
ations, (2.1-2.25) and (2.7-3.0). A third peak is observed around  = 1.4, and there is a gap
between this lower region and  = 1:7 which is uninhabited by any ecologies. Figure 9(c)
highlights the appearance of wallower ecologies at high  values. These wallower ecologies
help account for the lower average tness achieved with oating  compared to the standard
scenario with xed  . Thus a high  carries a signicant risk.
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Figure 9: Floating  results. (a) The average tness and average  across 196 runs for
2000 successive generations. (b) The distribution of the mean  for each generation. In this
contour plot, levels are shaded from white at low density levels to dark at high levels. (c)
The joint distribution of the mean average tness and the mean  , at two dierent angles.
Mean average tness is plotted from 1 to 3 and mean  from 0 to 3.
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When the above experiment was repeated with a oating ! and with  xed at its
standard scenario level 1:6, the oating ! evolved on average to a very low level. As for the
oating  case, the mean average tness reached was lower than for the standard scenario
case, and this mean masked a rich variety of behaviors. These results are shown in Figure 10.
Interestingly, the mean value of ! never rose above 0:53, the value where Q(L) = 1. However,
the distribution of values against generation shows that many ecologies did in fact have high
average !. Low ! is associated with a large number of wallower ecologies. Note that the
regions of high and low distribution values in the oating ! contour plot of Figure 10(c)
are much less distinct than the analogous ones in the oating  results. Figure 10(d) once
again shows the danger of being too intolerant of defection, for wallower ecologies tend to
be limited to the range (0-0.3).
5.5 Population Diversity
Our small populations quickly tend to lose genetic diversity. To a certain extent, this is an
inherent property of small populations, but to a certain extent it is also an artifact of the
way in which we have implemented our genetic algorithm. If we increased the mutation rate,
decreased the number of elite, or replaced elitism with reproduction proportional to tness,
then presumably the tness regions would become noisier and convergence to a stable level
of genetic diversity less likely. An eect that we did not anticipate, however, is that the
behavioral diversity of our populations is sensitive to the choice of sorting algorithm used to
select parents, even though the genetic diversity is not.
More precisely, in most of our simulations we use a bubble-sort algorithm to rank poten-
tial parents by tness. The bubble-sort algorithm is biased towards the incumbency of older
players. That is, in cases where a subset of players all have the same tness, as often occurs,
the players that achieved relatively higher rankings at the end of the previous generation are
again ranked higher, making their survival more likely. This incumbency eect, combined
with our use of strong elitism (X = 20), tends to promote the evolution of behaviorally
homogeneous populations.
Use of a heap-sort algorithm gives slightly noisier results but in general does not appear
to aect our conclusions. Under a randomized sorting algorithm, however, the tness regions
are noisier yet, and, although many of the features derived using bubble-sort remain, they
are less prominent. For example, Raquel-and-the-Bobs ecologies occur much less frequently
and regularly.
6 Concluding Remarks
The simulation studies reported in the present paper, in the companion paper Smucker et al.
(1994), and in Stanley et al. (1994) indicate that permitting players in an evolutionary IPD
to choose and refuse potential partners can have a signicant eect on the results. A key
issue that remains to be explored, however, is whether the eects we have found are generic
to choice and refusal or are closely tied to particular features of our implementation.
For example, our reliance on a synchronized genetic step, strong elitism, expected payos,
and a strict tolerance threshold may aect our outcomes signicantly. Also, using a xed
convex combination of past expected payo and current payo in order to obtain an updated
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Figure 10: Floating ! results. (a) The mean ! across 203 runs for 2000 successive generations,
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expected payo is too rigid and simplistic, even in the present context in which players have
no prior knowledge of other players' strategies and payos. Allowing the minimum tolerance
level  and the memory weight ! to evolve is a step towards increased exibility. More
generally, however, what would happen if players were free to evolve their partner selection
mechanisms from a broader domain? Some players might exhibit a preference for those they
have played before whereas others might display a taste for variety. Also, we might see the
emergence of a more sophisticated form of anticipatory behavior in the form of signals among
potential partners meant to inuence future partner selection.
Our long-term interest is to develop realistic models of human interactions in social and
economic contexts. The addition of choice and refusal of partners using expected payos
is intended to be a step in that direction. However, the PD game is a caricature of social
interactions. Applying the insights developed in the present paper to real situations will
require the modeling of more specic cases. One of our original goals was to develop a model
of sexual partner selection that could help in understanding and controlling the spread of
AIDS. Another possible application is to the endogenous formation of economic institutions;
see, for example, Holland (1992, Chapter 10) and Marimon et al. (1992). Tesfatsion (1994)
has modied the IPD/CR framework to develop a trade-coalition game with preferential
selection of trading partners and evolved trading networks.
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